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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF v t
Pkiinlill Appellee,
Case No. 20020703-SC

vs.
WADE WILLIS,
Dueniiam, Appelant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
jurisdiction is crimen eu upon i in linn liiipieme i mm piusuani in ihr pun is mi is
iif I It,ill ( 'oilc AnnoCilul ft 7S "» ?n»(a)

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REV ILW
W:.e.;.j:

Annotai

because it prohibits "iere possession of a firearm? Constitutional challenges to statutes
are questions of law reviewed by this court for correctness. State

" . 2000 TT ' »

358, f 3, 18 P.3d 500. This issue was preserved in a motion to dis;;.:.Ns . n
191).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, and others, property, or the state, as well as for other
lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the
legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.

Article I, § 26 of the Utah Constitution
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a)
[a] Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses
or has under his custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree
felony.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Wade Willis appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the
Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Court, after the entry of a conditional plea to
the charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony,
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and the Court of Appeals affirmation of his conviction. State v. Willis, 2002 UT App
229, 451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 52 P.3d 461.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Wade Willis was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on
August 15, 2000, with possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a), and theft, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-404, 412 (R. 2).
On October 4, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held at which time Willis was
bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of probable cause; and pleas of "not
guilty" were entered upon arraignment (R. 18, 191 at 26).
On October 11, 2000, Willis filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds
that the probation search of his residence constituted an illegal warrantless search under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 23-29). After a hearing on
January 2, 2001, Judge Gary D. Stott denied the motion (R. 42-43, 192).
On January 4, 2001, Willis filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Utah Code
Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) is unconstitutional on its face and in violation of the right
to keep and bear arms set forth in Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution (R. 45-124).
On February 6, 2001, Judge Stott denied the motion (R. 142-43).
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On March 23, 2001, Willis entered a plea of "guilty" to possession of a firearm
by a restricted person, a second degree felony, conditioned upon his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss (R. 164-71, 172-74, 177).
On May 11, 2001, Willis was sentenced to 180-days in the Utah County Jail,
ordered to pay a fine, and placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six
months (R. 180-82).
On June 8, 2001, Willis filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court (R.
184). On July 5, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed Willis' conviction. State v.
Wilis, 2002 UT App 229, 451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 52 P.3d 461.
On September 2, 2002, Willis filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals that was granted by this Court.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Jonathan Coones testified that he is the owner of a 9-milimeter handgun (R. 191
at 5). Coones testified that in August of 2000 the gun was kept on the top shelf of a
closet in his motor home which was located in his backyard in Spanish Fork (R. 191at
5, 7, 10). Coones testified that he knows Willis and that Willis was given permission
to enter the motor home by Coones' mother (R. 191 at 5-6). Sometime later, Coones
discovered that his gun was missing (R. 191 at 6). Coones asked Willis about the gun
but Willis denied taking it (R. 191 at 7). At the time, the gun turned up missing the
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lock on the motor home door did not work and a few other people had access to the
motor home (R. 191 at 8).
Eric Price, an employee of Adult Probation & Parole, testified that he is Willis'
probation officer and that in August of 2000 Willis was on felony probation for evading
a police officer, a third degree felony (R. 191 at 15). Price testified that he received a
call from Detective Mitchell and was informed that Willis was a suspect of a theft of a
firearm from Coones (R. 191 at 17-18). On August 1, 2000, Price-based on the
information he received from Mitchell-searched Willis' home located at 1516 South
320 East in Orem; and was present when a 9-millimeter firearm was found in Willis'
bedroom closet (R. 191 at 15-16, 18).
Brad Mitchell, a detective with the Spanish Fork Police Department, testified
that he investigated a complaint from Coones concerning the missing handgun (R. 191
at 20-21). Mitchell contacted Adult Probation & Parole and directed them to Willis'
home (R. 191 at 21). The serial number provided by Coones was the same serial
number that was on the gun found at Willis' residence (R. 191 at 21). Mitchell later
interviewed Willis and was told that "the handgun was given from Mr. Coones to his
mother and that his mother had asked him to store the gun in his bedroom for his
mother" (R. 191 at 22).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Willis asserts that the plain language of Article I, § 6, as it was amended in
1984, provides that an individual's right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,
and that it grants to the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms.
Accordingly, Willis asserts that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is
unconstitutional on its face because it infringes on the right of individuals—including
Willis-to merely "possess" or have "under [their] custody or control" any firearm and
subjects them to felony prosecution and possible incarceration.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED §76-10-503(2)(a) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE I, §6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
IS ERRONEOUS.

Willis asserts that the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a)
violates his individual right to bear and keep arms set forth in the plain language of
Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution because it makes mere possession of a firearm by
a restricted person a crime. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) essentially reads
that any category I restricted person who "purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has
under his custody or control: any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony"
(emphasis added). The trial court denied Willis' motion on grounds that this Court in
State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500, had ruled that this statute "does not
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" and that the statute "only
6

restricts [the right to bear arms] under very limited circumstances-such as a felony
indictment or conviction'' (R. 142) (quoting In, 2000 UT 358 at f 14). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court based on its prior decision in In and also
because the court found no distinction between the terms "use" and "possess".
Willis asserts that the Court of Appeals' reliance on State v. In is erroneous.
First, the Court of Appeals in In specifically did not address the issue of whether the
statute as it relates to mere possession of a firearm is constitutional on its face. In,
2000 UT App 358 at \ 3, n.2. Similarly, the Court of Appeals in State v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah App. 1991), refused to reach the merits of a similar
constitutional challenge as to possession of a weapon by a parolee because the issue was
not raised in the trial court and did not rise to the level of plain error. Accordingly,
contrary to the trial court's ruling, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals had ever
addressed the issue of whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) as it relates to
mere possession of a firearm is unconstitutional on its face in regards to the current
plain language of Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution.
Second, in In, the defendant actually used a firearm rather than merely
possessing it. 2000 UT App 358 at f 2. The legislature's ability to regulate the use of
arms is not impeded by the plain language of Article I, § 6. Accordingly, the Appeals'
Court statement in In, 2000 UT App 358 at 1f 14, that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10503(2)(a) "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" because
it "only restricts that right under very limited circumstances - such as felony or
7

indictment or conviction" is correct as it relates to use of a weapon by a restricted
person - which is the factual scenario that was presented in In. See also Willis, 2002
UTApp229att3.
However, Willis asserts that the Court of Appeals' distinction between the terms
"use" and "possess" in the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is
erroneous. When examining statutory language, appellate courts are to "assume the
legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning."
State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, f 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citing Nelson v. Salt Lake
County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). Furthermore, appellate courts should "avoid
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hall v.
State Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, 1 15, 24 P.3d 958. See also State v. McKinnon,
2002 UT App 214, 51 P.3d 729 n.4.
The legislature saw fit to include both "use" and "possess" in § 76-10-503(2)(a).
The terms "use" and "possess" have different ordinary meanings. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals erred in finding no distinction between the terms. Moreover, in
failing to define the terms according to their ordinary meaning, the Court of Appeals
has effectively rendered the term "possess" superfluous and inoperative.
Third, pre-1984 case law is not on point and is not dispositive on this issue.
Thus, the Court of Appeals' reliance on pre-1984 case law such as State v. Beorchia,
530 P.2d 813 (Utah 1974), is misplaced.
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Prior to January 1, 1985, Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution read: "The
people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature
may regulate the exercise of this right by law." State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 680
(Utah 1982). Based upon this language this Court in State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813,
814 (Utah 1974), held that a statute which made it a class A misdemeanor for noncitizens to possess any dangerous weapon did not violate Article I, § 6 because it "is
quite evident from the language [of the amendment] that the Legislature had sufficient
power to enact the statute in question." This Court in Beorchia also held that the
statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution because "[t]he sale, use and possession of firearms are
proper subjects of regulation by the State" and "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is not
generally applied so as to restrict exercise of the police powers of the State."
A few years later this Court addressed the constitutionality of this same statute
under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Vlacil, 645
P.2d 677 (Utah 1982). This Court concluded "the right to bear arms under the federal
constitution is collective rather than individual." 645 P.2d at 679. Based upon this
conclusion, this Court held that "an individual's right to bear arms is subject to the
police power of the various states." 645 P.2d at 679. Accordingly, the statute that
made it a crime for non-citizens to possess a dangerous weapon was not prohibited by
the Second Amendment either.

After the decisions in Beorchia and Vlacil, the Utah Legislature changed the
language of Article I, § 6 in order to secure greater individual rights. See M. Truman
Hunt, The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory Pacifier?, 4 Utah L.Rev. 751,
751-755 (1986). This constitutional amendment was approved by the electorate in
November of 1984, and took effect on January 1, 1985. Article I, § 6 of the Utah
Constitution now reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense
of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
Willis asserts that this amendment clarifies that the right to bear and possess
arms under the state constitution is an individual right rather than a collective one.
Further, the language of this current constitutional provision was specifically designed
to guarantee "broad individual liberties and protect[] the enjoyment of those liberties
from infringement." 4 Utah L.Rev. at 752 n.8, (citing Utah Voter Information
Pamphlet, 28 (1984)).
In addition, whereas prior to the 1984 amendment, the Legislature had the ability
to "regulate the exercise" of the right to bear arms by law, now the Legislature only
has the ability to "defin[e] the lawful use of arms" (emphasis added). Therefore, Willis
asserts that the plain language of Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution prevents the
legislature from limiting or restricting an individual's right to possess and keep
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firearms. Moreover, "In considering the meaning of a constitutional provision, a court
must begin its analysis with the plain language of the provision and need not look
beyond the plain language unless some ambiguity is found." Utah School Boards Ass'n
v. Utah State Bd. Of Education, 2001 UT 2, % 13, 17 P.3d 1125 (quoting In re
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996)).
Because the plain language of Article I, § 6 provides that an individual's right to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and because the plain language also grants to
the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms, Willis asserts that Utah
Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) is unconstitutional on its face because it violates the
plain language of Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution and infringes on the right of
individuals-including Willis-to merely "possess" or have "under [their] custody or
control" any firearm and subjects them to felony prosecution and possible
incarceration. Moreover, Article I, § 26 of the Utah Constitution states, "The
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words
they are declared to be otherwise."
Furthermore, legislative history of Article I, §6 (1985) is not helpful. It appears
that when the amendment process began, the legislators desired to insure a state
individual right to keep and bear arms (Utah H., Debate on Sen. Jt. Res. No. 2, 1-3 on
the Floor of the House, (Mar. 7, 1983)). The voter information pamphlet for
November 6, 1984 indicates in the "Arguments For" section that "convicted felons,
mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not be guaranteed" the right to
11

keep and bear arms. Voter Information Pamphlet page 28. In the "Rebuttal To"
section, the author warns that the language of the amendment itself makes no mention
of classes of people who are not protected by the amendment. Id. It also appears that
the amendment was not studied by the Judiciary Interim Study Committee or by the
Constitutional Study and Revision Commission. Id. at 4-5, 9-10; (minutes of the
Constitutional Revision Committee, 5/25/84 page 2) (R. 118-24, 123).
Willis asserts that while this Court may deem the constitutional amendment of
Article I, § 6 unwise, judicial compensation is not the answer. If the legislature wants
to penalize offenders for possessing weapons, the legislature needs to propose an
amendment to the constitution and submit it to the electorate.
If this Court were to save the statute penalizing mere possession of weapons by
offenders by finding that, in defining lawful use of arms under Article I, § 6, the
legislature may proscribe mere possession, the constitutional right to keep and bear
arms would be an empty shell for all of us. Moreover, Willis asserts that Article I, §
26 of the Utah Constitution requires this Court to give effect to the plain language of
Article I, § 6. Accordingly, Willis asks that this Court reverse the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Willis asks this Court to reverse the Court of
Appeals' decision on the ground that the statute which makes it unlawful for a restricted
person to merely possess a firearm violates his individual right to keep arms as
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. Willis further asks that this matter be remanded
to the Fourth District with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn, and the matter
dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of May, 2003.

Margaret. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 14th day of
May, 2003.

Margaret J^ Liifclsay
Counsel for Appellant
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76-10-503

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be loaded
when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball
or shot in the barrel or cylinders.
1990
76-10-503.

Restrictions o n p o s s e s s i o n , p u r c h a s e , transfer, and o w n e r s h i p of d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n s by
c e r t a i n persons.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as
defined in Section 76-3-203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in
Section 62A-7-101; or
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated
delinquent for an offense which if committed by an
adult would have been a violent felony as defined in
Section 76-3-203.5.
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for
any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years h a s been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by
an adult would have been a felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance
as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is
knowingly and intentionally in unlawful possession
of a Schedule I controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity
for a felony offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand
trial for a felony offense;
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as
provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has
been committed to a mental institution;
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in
the United States;
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the
armed forces; or
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been
a citizen of the United States.
(2) A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both
ategories at the same time.
(5) If a higher penalty t h a n is prescribed in this section is
rovided in another section for one who purchases, transfers,
ossesses, uses, or has under this custody or control any
angerous weapon, the penalties of that section control. 2000
6-10-504.

Carrying c o n c e a l e d d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n —
Penalties.
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsecons (2) and (3):
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous
weapon, as defined in Section 76-10-501, which is not a
firearm on his person or one that is readily accessible for
immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined
in this part, in a place other than his residence, property,
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or business under his control is guilty of
a c a
misdemeanor; and
* *s B
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm
who carries a concealed dangerous weapon wh' vf 1 ^
firearm and t h a t contains no ammunition is gujif ** *
class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains
^
nition the person is guilty of a class A m i s d e m e a n o r ^
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shot?i
sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree felony.
^m°rt
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission f
violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5, and the DP
is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second dee***
felony.
^
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful taking of protected or unprotected wildlife
as defined in Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code, from carrying
a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm with a barrel
length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of wildlife
does not occur:
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of
that municipality's ordinances; or
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section
41-6-1.
2000
76-10-505.

C a r r y i n g l o a d e d firearm i n vehicle, on
street, or i n p r o h i b i t e d area.
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not
carry a loaded firearm:
(a) in or on a vehicle;
(b) on any public street; or
(c) in a posted prohibited area.
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
1990

76-10-505.5. P o s s e s s i o n of a d a n g e r o u s weapon, firearm, or sawed-off s h o t g u n o n or about school
premises — Penalties.
(1) A person may not possess any dangerous weapon, firearm, or sawed-off shotgun, as those terms are defined in
Section 76-10-501, at a place that the person knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is on or about school premises.
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or about school
premises is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed-off shotgun on or
about school premises is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) This section applies to any person, except persons authorized to possess a firearm as provided under Sections
53-5-704, 53-5-705, 53A-3-502, 76-10-511, 76-10-523, Subsection 76-10-504(2), and as otherwise authorized by law.
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a more
serious weapons offense that may occur on or about school
1997
premises.
76-10-506. T h r e a t e n i n g w i t h or u s i n g dangerous
w e a p o n in fight or quarrel.
Every person, except those persons described in Section
76-10-503, who, not in necessary self defense in the presence
of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous
weapon in an angry and threatening m a n n e r or unlawfully
uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
1992
76-10-507.

P o s s e s s i o n of d e a d l y w e a p o n w i t h intent to
assault.
Every person having upon his person any dangerous
weapon with intent to unlawfully assault another is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
1973
76-10-508.

D i s c h a r g e of firearm from a v e h i c l e , near a
highway, or i n d i r e c t i o n of a n y p e r s o n , building, or v e h i c l e — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous
weapon or firearm:

JARED W. ELDRIDGE (8176)
Attorney for Defendant
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC
245 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 379-2570
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rN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

MOTION TO DISMISS

:
:

vs.

WADE LEON WILLIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 001403071
JUDGE STOTT
:

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATUTE PROHIBITING PEOPLE ON PROBATION OR PAROLE FOR
ANY FELONY FROM POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON VIOLATES THE
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

Possession of weapons for any lawful purpose is protected by the 1985 revision of Article
I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution which reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.

The statute with which Mr. Willis is charged §76-10-503(2)(a) purports to penalize mere
possession of weapons without any regard to the use or purpose of the weapon. It reads:
(2)

Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a)

any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony

This issue was argued but not decided in State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, (Utah App.
1991). (attached) The court, at 926, declined to reach the merits of a similar constitutional challenge
as to parolees because the issue was not raised in the trial court. The appellate court held that failure
of the trial court to have recognized the unconstitutionality of the statute was not plain error. The
Court of Appeals found no plain error holding that the new amendment to Article I, §6 of the Utah
Constitution did not obviously invalidate prior Utah authority approving restrictions of weapon
possession.
Although the Archambeau court was correct that such statutes had previously been approved,
it incorrectly discounted the Legislative history of this amendment which is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference.1 The debate regarding the amendment indicates that the amendment was

1

Reference to the legislative history (in Appendix 1) is not dispositive. It appears
that when the amendment process began, the legislators desired to insure a state individual right
to keep and bear arms (House floor debates on Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, 3/7/83 pages 1-3).
It appears that the amendment was not studied by the Judiciary Interim Study Committee
or by the Constitutional Study and Revision Commission (House floor debates on Senate Joint
Resolution No. 2, 3/7/83 pages 4-5, 9-10; minutes of the Constitutional Revision Committee,
5/25/84 page 2).
The voter information pamphlet for November 6, 1984 indicates in the "Arguments For"
section that "convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not be
guaranteed" the right to keep and bear arms. Pamphlet page 28. In the "Rebuttal To" section,
the author warns that the language of the amendment itself makes no mention of classes of
people who are not protected by the amendment. Id.
Additional history of the amendment is found in "The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An
Illusory Public Pacifier?", 1986 Utah L.Rev. 751, 751-755 and accompanying notes.

passed in an effect to "overrule" and nullify the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Vlacil,
645 P.2 697, (Utah 1982) which held that the right to bear arms was a collective rather than an
individual right and that the Legislature could regulate possession of weapons.
II

THE COURT SHOULD RELY ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH
C O N S T I T U T I O N IN STRIKING THIS STATUTE DOWN AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

While the Utah Constitution allows for legislation defining the lawful use of weapons, it
flatly prohibits legislation infringing on the individual right to keep and bear arms for any lawful
purpose. It states:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 6 (1985 version in 1990 supp.).
This Court must strike the statute purporting to penalize mere possession of dangerous
weapons because it infringes the individual right to keep and bear arms and does not define a lawful
(or unlawful) use of arms.
Reference to basic tenets of federalism and Utah constitutional construction, establish that
this argument is properly raised for this Court's adjudication.
A.

PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM CALL FOR A RULING UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION

As is discussed more fully below, basic tenets of federalism call for this Court to enforce the
Utah Constitution in answering this question of state law.
The United States of America is a federation of state governments. The states preceded the
federation and hold general, residual powers to govern, which are limited only by the state and

federal constitutions In contrast, the federal government's powers are limited to those enumerated
in the federal constitution See ej*_ Constitution of Utah States, Amendment X This federalist form
of government is based on historical distrust, fear and confinement of centralized government, and
historical trust and empowerment of local government to represent and serve the citizens of each
state

See e ^ Manning v Sevier County 517 P 2d 549, 553-554 (Utah 1973) Crockett, J

concurring, joined by Ellett J , Hennod, J )
Federalist reliance on local government and limitation of centralized government is reflected
m the differences between state and federal constitutions

State constitutions are tailored to the

regions they govern, they are detailed and specific, they are dynamic On the other hand, the federal
constitution is uniform, general, and unchanging

Compare the frequently amended Utah

Constitution with the federal constitution See also Utah Code Ann Section 63-54-1 et seg (Utah
Constitution Revision Study Commission created to study Utah Constitution, inform governor and
legislature of needed changes)
Federalism is a principle that is important m Utah The people of this state historically have
cherished local government and fought to limit federal intrusion into questions of state law E g L J
Arlington and D Bitton, The Mormon Experience, 161-184 Our state Supreme Court was perhaps
the last state court to accept "incorporation" of provisions of the federal Bill of Rights See e g
Manning v Sevier County, 517 P 2d549,553 fUtah!973¥Crockett J concurring, jointed by Ellett,
J , Hennod, J ) (federal incorporation doctrine is disingenuous, violative of principles of federalism,
first amendment to United States Constitution does not apply to state actors)
The question raised m this case, whether individual citizens should be allowed to possess
weapons, is a question of state law While the federal constitution does have a provision referring
to a right to bear arms, that provision applies exclusively to federal government - not state

government. E.g. State v. Vlacil 645 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah 1982). The federal provision refers to
a collective right, which does not protect individuals. Id. The federal provision is interpreted
narrowly as facilitating militias. Id.
Utah, like many other states, has a state constitutional provision protecting the individual
right to keep and bear arms. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 6 (1985, in 1990 Supp.).2 The
language of the current constitutional provision relating to the individual right to keep and bear arms
was passed by a strong majority of the Utah legislature after years of negotiation and revision. "The
Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?", 1986 Utah L.Rev. 751, 753-754
nn. 13. (attached) The language of the current constitutional provision relating to the individual right
to keep and bear arms was passed by a strong majority of the Utah voters. Id. At n.12.
Basic principles of federalism call on this Court to recognize and follow this constitutional
provision in deciding this case.
B.

PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION CALL FOR A
RULING UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION.

Mr. Willis' argument that the statute penalizing the mere possession of weapons violates the
plain language of the Utah Constitution comports with the Utah Constitutional rule that the Utah
Constitution is to be applied in accordance with its express terms. Article I section 26 of the Utah
Constitution provides:
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory,
unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
Article I section 26 (1953).

2

Reference to other state constitutional provisions and decisions is not helpful; Utah's
provision is unique and apparently the broadest in the nation. See Appendix 2 (containing
provisions from other state constitutions).

The argument that the plain language of the Utah Constitution should be given effect is also
consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, which is explicitly recognized in the Utah
Constitution. Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (1953). Sutherland explains how judicial
allegiance to the plain language enacted by the legislature is required by the doctrine of separation
of powers:
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a
statute is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The courts owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a
legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence
of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to
give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court
has captured this idea in the following language: "It is an elementary
proposition that courts only determine by construction the scope and
intent of the law when the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a
law is plain and within the legislative power, it declares itself and
nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as
upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the
law must mean something different from the common import of its
language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or
harsh would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the
government, and practically invest it with the lawmaking power. The
remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation but in amendment or
repeal."
Sutherland, Statutory Construction,§46.03
While this Court may deem the constitutional amendment of Article I section 6 unwise, or
even dangerous, judicial compensation is not the answer. If the legislature wants to penalize
offenders for possessing weapons, the legislature needs to propose an amendment to the constitution
and submit it to the electorate.
If this Court were to save the statute penalizing mere possession of weapons by offenders by
finding that, in defining lawful use of arms under Article I section 6, the legislature may proscribe
mere possession, the constitutional right to keep and bear arms would be an empty shell for all of

us. Article I section 26 of the Utah Constitution (requiring literal interpretation of Utah Constitution)
and Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution (requiring separation of judicial, legislative, and
executive powers) require this Court to give effect to the plain language of Article I section 6(1985).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above argument and authorities Mr. Willis respectfully requests this Court to
dismiss Count I, unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, on the ground
that the statute violates his individual right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution.
DATED this 2

day of October, 2000.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Utah County Attorney's
Office, 150 East Center, Provo, Utah 84601, this

day of January, 2001.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
0
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 001403071
vs.
Judge Gary D. Stott
WADE LEON WILLIS,
Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed January 4, 2001, and his
accompanying memorandum in support thereof. The State filed an Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and the Defendant filed a Response.
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I of this prosecution on the grounds that U.C.A. § 7610-503(2)(a) violates Defendant's right to keep and bear arms pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of
the Utah Constitution. This provision of the Utah Constitution reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of
self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall
not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the
lawful use of arms.
The Defendant argues that a portion of the statute under which Defendant was charged is at odds
with this provision of the Utah Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional. Defendant was
charged under U.C.A. § 76-10-503(2)(a), which reads:
(2) Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has
under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony.
Defendant maintains that the Utah Constitution has granted the legislature the power to regulate
the use of firearms, but not ihe possession of firearms. Defendant asserts that this statute is
unconstitutional because it prohibits the mere possession of a firearm, the crime with which
Defendant was charged in Count I.

-1-

The recent case of State v. l a 2000 UT App. 358, addresses the constitutionality of
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a) in light of Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. The Appellate
Court noted that "[w]hen addressing [constitutional challenges], this court presumes that the
statute is valid, and [resolves] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id The court
then concluded that the statute "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear
arms. This statute only restricts that right under very limited circumstances—such as a felony
indictment or conviction. Such restrictions are constitutional." Id (citations omitted). The court
further cited State v. Beorchia. 530 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1974), as holding that this statute is a
proper exercise of State police powers.
In light of this recent appellate decision, the Court holds that the restrictions contained in
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a), including the restriction of mere possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, do not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms because the statute only
restricts that right under very limited circumstances. Defendant's Motion is Dismiss is therefore
denied.
DATED this

&-

day of.

. 2001.

BY THE COURT
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LV1KS0N, Presiding Judge:
11 1 Defendant appeals his conviction
subsequent to a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, a second-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. $
76-10-503f2X») ($TO,2001) (Weapons
Restrictions Statute). [FN 1 ] We affirm.

FN1, This section provides, in
pertinent part, "[a] Category I
restricted person who purchases,
transfers, possesses, uses, or has
under his custody or control: (a)
any firearm is guilty of a second
degree felony." Utah Code Ann. $
7fH0-S03qXt) (STOqOOlV

[lj[2] H 2 Defendant challenges the statute
under which he was convicted as being
unconstitutional on its face.
" 'A
constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which we
review for correctness.... When addressing
such a challenge, *462 this court presumes
that the statute is valid, and we resolve any
reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.'" State v. Momson. 2001
UT 73.K S. 31 PJd S47 (Utah 20011
(alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Lopes. 1909 UT 2 4 * 6. 980 P.2d 191).
ANALYSIS
Ul 11 3 State v In. 2000 C T App 358, 18
P J d 500. is controlling. In that case we

stated that the Weapons Restrictions
Statute
does not unconstitutionally interfere with
one's right to bear arms. This statute
only restricts that right under very
limited circumstances-such as a felony
indictment or conviction.
Such
restrictions are constitutional. See Utah
Const art L § 6 ...;[ JFN21] State v
*«ortto530P.2d813.815 (Utah 1974)
(holding that this section is a proper
exercise of State police powers).

FN2. Utah Const, art. I $ 6
provides: "The individual right of
the people to keep and bear arms
for security and defense of self,
family, and others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but
nothing herein shall prevent the
legislature from defining the lawful
use of arms/1
Id. at «f 14. Defendant attempts to
distinguish the present case by arguing that
In only addresses the constitutionality of
the statute as it applies to use, as opposed
to "mere possession of a firearm by a
restricted person/' (Emphasis added.)
However, our conclusion in In, a case in
which the defendant was convicted of
illegally possessing a firearm, simply
stated that the restrictions contained in
"this statute do[ ] not unconstitutionally
interfere with one's right to bear arms,"
and made no distinction between use and
possession. A/. Because //? made no
distinction between use and possession, its

Copr 0 West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works

conclusion that the Weapons Restrictions
Statute is constitutional applies both to
restrictions on possession and to
restrictions on use. I FN3]

FN3. Moreover, we note that one
may "use" a firearm by the mere act
of possessing it—e.g., to deter
unlawful behavior in "defense of
self, family, and others" etc. Utah
Const art! § 6. By way of further
illustration, we note that the United
States, by mere possession of a
nuclear arsenal, theoretically "uses"
that arsenal to deter would-be
aggressors from taking military
action against it. We also note that
Utah Const art L § 6 makes no
distinction between passive use and
active use of a firearm.

f 4 Accordingly, we reject Defendant's
constitutional challenge to the Weapons
Restrictions Statute and affirm his
conviction for possession of a firearm by a
restricted person.
t 5 Affirmed.

H 6 We Concur: JAMES Z DAVIS and
WILLIAM A, THORNE JR.. Judges.
52 P.3d 461,451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,2002
UT App 229
END OF DOCUMENT
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